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That advances in technology occasion ontological ambiguity 
and re-orientation is certainly not novel. Inventions that 
could reproduce images mechanically, such as photography, 
fundamentally transformed the cultural understanding of the 
world of visual artifacts. The embalming of temporal change 
made possible by the emergence of cinema toward the end of 
the 19th century represented yet another ontological mutation. 
Throughout the following decades, the emergence of sound 
film, television, video, interactive computer games, algorithmic 
images, machine vision, and VR systems have continuously 
redefined the nature of the image for us. For some, the shift in the 
medium’s ontology brought on by computer-generated images 
is considerably more dramatic than those previous evolutions, 
resulting in a surprising—and somewhat paradoxical—turn in 
visual culture toward the invisible. Machine-readable files, which 
generate images to be looked at only intermittently, entail, in the 
words of Trevor Paglen, a “widespread automation of vision.”1 
From automatic license-plate readers (ALPRs) to motion-
tracking systems, such as Realeyes, and Facebook’s DeepFace 
algorithm, this mechanization of visual culture brings about the 
proliferation of images that are no longer representational but 
instead actively intervene in our everyday lives.2 In terms of the 
processing capability of such images, the neural networks that 
scan photographs on social media—to put it into perspective—
can marshal “a degree of attention that would make even the most 
steadfast art historian blush.”3 
It is highly probable that the spread of machine vision 
has biopolitical implications that are potentially enormous. 
Reconceptualizing Nikolas Rose’s term “molecular politics,” 
Peter Lindner has argued that our new technological reality ushers 
in an “aretaic” era, characterized by an intensifying reliance on 
a plethora of sensory gadgets.4 Technologies that transcend our 
somatic limitations—wearable devices such as sleep and fitness 
trackers, apps for analyzing nutrition, drones—define this new, 
heavily “datafied” condition. The aretaic shift, Lindner holds, 
introduces “a peculiar ethics of leading a healthy life as well as 
a new kind of somatization of identity.”5 The self that emerges 
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out of these socio-technical constellations is an informational 
self, relational rather than biological, governed by a quantifiable, 
best-practice approach to being human rather than by a more 
heterogeneous, spiritual understanding of humanness. Perhaps 
worryingly, the informational self relies on behavioral norms 
whose authority rests not so much with ethical or social principles 
as with the figurations of mass data.
In his essay, Paglen suggests that in order to negotiate this new 
visual culture of the invisible image we really need to “unlearn 
how to see like humans.”6 Maybe he is right. But the question 
lingers whether this is really feasible, even if desired. In what 
follows, I would like to try to think beyond the divides of the 
analogue/digital, visible/invisible, human/machine, and image/
data to address the problem of the ontology of the image from a 
position that is hopefully less beholden to the popular interpretive 
frames of our times. Two assumptions will ground my argument. 
The first is that there are no clean breaks, nor slates, in history. In 
the face of even the most fundamental upheavals, widely divergent 
conceptualizations and ontologies might co-exist for a long time. 
The ascendancy of digital technologies and machine vision 
institutes massive disruptions—socially, culturally, economically, 
politically, and maybe even cognitively. But does it change 
everything? Our entanglements with aretaic devices, surveillance 
appliances, and artificial intelligence seem to grow deeper by the 
day, that is true. I now own a Fitbit watch, which is a nice thing to 
have. Being hooked up to this contraption nonstop, however, is 
not so exhilarating that I forget to watch movies or play records 
(the other day I saw The Conformist again (Bernardo Bertolucci, 
1970), admittedly in a digitized version). I still worry about how 
isolated many of our students have become during the pandemic. 
I read up on the new and emerging social order in Rojava, Syria, 
for a book that I am completing. University politics appears torn 
between factions that want to pool all of the resources into just a 
few prioritized areas and factions that want to defend pluralism. 
I supervise student projects on topics like war cinema, Black 
feminism, and why there are so few statues of women in public 
spaces. Everyone I meet—I would say there are no exceptions—
seem preoccupied pretty much with the same thoughts, challenges 
and feelings that they had before images became data. While I 
know that the image of my daughter playing soccer is technically 




I guess my point here is that the turn toward the operative, or 
operational image does not curtail our continued reflection about 
the perpetually elusive nature of the image. This brings me to my 
second assumption, this time in the form of a question. Is there such 
a thing as an ontology uncontaminated by the semantic field that 
purports to provide its definition? The transition to an “invisible” 
visual culture that Paglen talks about seems predicated upon a 
strictly technical conceptualization of the image. If determined 
by other conceptual parameters, say, culture or aesthetics, our 
ontological grasp of the image might be quite different. Banal 
as this observation in some ways is, it nonetheless flags up the 
untenability of believing that one can identify a realm of meaning 
beyond any of these vast notions that alone have the discursive 
authority to settle the essence of something. As I write this, a 
newsletter from Bloomsbury appears in my inbox, providing 
notice of three new books that have just been published in their 
“Film and Media Studies” series. One is Daniel Herwitz’s The 
Political Power of Visual Art, on aesthetics and political agency. 
The second is Robert B. Pippin’s re-interpretation of the cinema of 
Douglas Sirk, in which he argues that Sirk’s films should be seen 
as a subversion of the genre of melodrama. Lastly, there is Roland 
Barthes and Film by Patrick ffrench [sic], an engagement with the 
place of cinema in the French intellectual’s thought. It is of course 
too easy to pick such random examples from the ceaseless flow of 
new publications, but that is exactly my point. Each of these three 
casually selected books presuppose, however tacitly, a particular 
conception of the image that has nothing to do with the invisible 
culture of algorithms that Paglen addresses in his essay.
An initial response to the question of the changing ontology 
of the image in a post-digital environment would thus be to 
accentuate the unruly—and for some, vexed—multiplicity of 
possible ontologies sticking to our perceptions, prosaic as well 
as scientific, of what that thing we call an image actually is. As 
crucial as materiality is to the identity of any given medium, it 
still cannot define it solely on its own terms. The discourse of any 
given discipline or intellectual formation, as Gertrud Koch has 
pointed out, inevitably “constitutes” its objects.7 When it comes 
to the medium of film in particular, Koch invokes Foucault’s 
concept to reflect upon a cinematic dispositif that “arranges 
our ways and modes of speaking and thinking about film.”8 
Comprising such a dispositif, for Koch, are components such as 
the institutionalized frameworks within which film production 
and reception take place, the physical milieu in which screenings 
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occur, and the affective reactions that any given film produces. 
Equally vital to such a dispositif, I would argue, is the entire cache 
of writings and discussions that historically have been generated 
around cinema as a machine of human expressiveness. 
Without losing sight of the inherent heterogeneity of 
interpretations that accrue to the idea of the image, in what 
follows I want to consider ways in which our current predicament 
could conceivably teach us something new about images and their 
amorphous presence in our world. Can the pandemic image—
the iconic manifestation of which might be the Zoom meeting, 
with its black screens and wall of miniature faces—convey 
something about “imageness” that we have either forgotten or 
failed adequately to address before? The evacuation of sociality 
from physical space to the virtual space of the computer screen 
that marks the contemporary moment re-emphasizes what the 
philosopher Hagi Kenaan has called “the rule of the frontal.”9 
In his theory, the process of seeing itself has been subject to a 
transformation by which the eye has become both gluttonous 
and insensitive. Having access to boundless visual information, 
the eye absorbs everything indiscriminately. On our immaculate 
interfaces, different images comingle in every conceivable 
combination; the haggard Zoom faces, the bystander footage of 
police brutality, the YouTube video of a parrot singing “Stairway 
to Heaven,” the highlights from the Champions League semifinals, 
the corporate logos, and the slides from the digital family 
album. We are relentlessly manipulated, Kenaan claims, by the 
commodifying logic of the market that presently is the biggest 
generator of the visual field. Addicted to instant stimulation, the 
eye has attained a state of permanent unexcitability, knowing 
“only one form of relationship: an unchanging uniform distance.”10 
Staring into the screen, Kenaan writes, 
the living space of the eye yields to the domination of the 
homogeneous where all points of view take on identical form. 
Since the screen functions as a frame for contents packaged 
and served in a way that fits the consumer’s needs to begin 
with, the manner of accessing the phenomenal, the angle of 
observation, the kind of involvement—the orientation, the 
self-positioning—do not play any actual role but constitute 
a minor and negligible by-product of what appears in front 
of us. And indeed, everything is already there, framed and 
frontally presented, for everyone and no one in particular. 
The various contents that appear on the screen always have 
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an identical, essentially flat structure, not because of the 
screen’s physical characteristics but rather because of the way 
in which the screen creates what Baudrillard calls ‘the degree 
zero of meaning,’ that is, a meaning whose internal form and 
constitutive logic is that of a commercial.11
On this account, the regression of the visual to the frontal is so 
commanding that it could be considered as a new ontological 
condition in itself. A paradox, for Kenaan, is that the 
overwhelming accessibility and diversity of images only lead to 
a shapeless sameness experientially. Gathered together in one 
singular, impoverished perspective, the contents of our screen 
lack depth, dimensionality, and sincerity. The screen prohibits 
the possibility of any real encounter, and its flat homogeneity 
impedes the qualities of the human gaze, “its freedom and 
concomitant responsibility, its ability to be involved, its constant 
involvement, its ability to be critical, to be intimate, to sense 
shame, to refuse.”12
While Kenaan turns toward the work of Emmanuel Levinas 
and his mysterious phrase ethics is an optics to find an alternative 
to the levelling of the screen—the rule of the frontal—I want, in 
closing, to go in a slightly different direction. An intriguing aspect 
of Kenaan’s admittedly bleak analysis of contemporary visuality 
is the peculiar dialectics of phenomenological richness and 
existential privation. This is a relation that could be re-translated 
as one between connectivity and absence. The “enzooming” of 
pandemic communication, both professionally and socially, 
is describable as an expansive, rapidly multiplying network 
of digital linkages. But its sheer ubiquity also underlines the 
structured absence that is constitutive of the photographic image. 
Both in its analog and digital instantiations, the apparatuses 
of photography and film are in one sense machines for the 
production of absence. We can see the objects, but they are not 
really there. When we think about someone who is not with us 
spatially, we can summon their presence in our minds. When we 
see that same person in a photograph, or on a screen, they are 
still not really with us, but the fact of their immediate visibility 
may in fact underscore the reality that they are elsewhere. The 
screen does provide us with information—that is undeniable—but 
it also creates visualizations of absence. Some of the foremost 
theorists of the photographic image have of course been on to this. 
In Camera Lucida (1980), Roland Barthes addresses the “madness” 
of photography, calling it “a new form of hallucination” that is 
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“false on the level of perception, true on the level of time.”13 By 
this, he means that the photograph indexes and thereby confirms 
the temporary, limited existence of the object in the moment of 
capture, but that what is given to us to look at is an illusion, an 
ontologically reduced proxy at best. In André Bazin’s ambitious 
psychology of the desire of image-making, he speculates that 
the drive to produce images throughout history stems from 
an impossible objective to overcome absence; what he refers 
to as “the mummy complex” plays itself out as the business of 
attempting to preserve a fragment of the lost object in some kind 
of representational state.14 But the irony is that the successful 
reproduction of the object in a form determined by technological 
and aesthetic processes also at the same time draws attention to 
its absent status. One of the etymological meanings of the word 
“screen” is “to conceal” or “cover,” which is yet another reminder 
that the ontology of the screened image may have more to do with 
the production of absence than we are accustomed to think.
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